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In writing chis paper the author has at~empted to 
give the reader a solia grounding in the political, economic, 
and diplomatic hfustory of affairs at, or about, the opening 
of the recent crisis in hlanchuria. He has endeavored to make 
certain statements which it is desirable to make in view of 
the highly misleading asser~tions which have been made by 
Japanese spokesmen in their attempts to place in less repre-
hensible light the acts of their country during the last 
twenty-three months. lRhroughout the paper the at-cempt has 
been made to inter•pret carefully and thor·oughlY) underlying 
causes, motives, and results. 
In presenting this paper the author has been guided 
by the principle that truth speaks louder than propaganda. 
the following pages contain indisputable facts and state-
ments, which, in my belief, should assist the reader in 
understanding the present crisis, so dramatically precipi-
tated by Japan's invasion of kanchuria. 
The author is personally greatly indebted to Profes-
sor James H. Sheldon of Boston University and to Miss 
Esther Coleman for their kimmess in malcing valuable criti-
cism and in reading the manuscript. 
c.w.w. 
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I. THE GEOGhAPHY OF MiiliCHUiH.A 
Manchuria is situated in the northeastern part of 
China. It is separated from Siberia on the north by the 
Arnur River. On the west Eastern Inner l'•iongolia touches its 
borders and stretches, a vast level country, far to the 
westward. On the east, the Maritime Province of Russia forms 
the boundary of Manc:quria, and southeast the Yalu River 
separates it from Korea. On the south it is washed by the 
waters of the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Pechile. 
Manehuria covers the territory which is now known as 
the Three Eastern Provinces of China - Liao-Ning, Kirin, 
and Heilung, including the Kwantung Leased Territory, total-
ling about 3b0,000 square miles. ln size, it is four and 
one half times that of Great Britain, and equal to America's 
five wheat-belt states combined - Minnesota, South Dakota, 
North Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. 
The climate of Manchuria is included within the par-
allels of 39° and 53° 30 11 north. In accordance with the 
KBppen system,{l) the climate of the southern two thirds of 
Manchuria is a cold, dry, winter type, with the summer suf-
ficiently rainy to permit forest growth. The mean tempera-
ture of the coldest month is below 3bc, and that of the 
l-· warmest month, over 22' C; it occurs in Heilunkiang and east-
ern Kirin. The southern part of the Barga dfustrict has the 
' ~~=~,0~ . ·'=---~-=-=·---~-==== 
( 1) VJ. Koppen, 11 IJie Klimate der Erde 11 , 1923 
Part 2, 11 Das Geographische System der Klimate". 
.... ~=o=~=-~_,.;;;;;,==============-~~:::-~=--:-::'---~-~--~-~~~--~-~ -'---.................... ==~~~""':'"'""":----:---:--:::---\-.1 
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cold steppe-dry winter climate. Here precipitation is very 
low, and the mean annual temperature is below 18°C, but the 
warmest month is over l8°C. Winter is the dry period. As a 
whole) the climate is healthful and well adapted to agricul-
ture. Its great plains boast a rich soil, und the 27,000,000 
acres of land now under cultiv-ation produce huge crops of' 
beans, wheat, millet, Indman corn, and other products. 
Geologically, Manchuria is separated into three divi-
sions: (1) the plain lands of' alluvial, low-lying flats and 
higher gravelly terraces which are drained by the Zungari 
and the Liao Rivers and their tl'ibutary streams; (2) the 
mpuntainous lands of ancient rocks that surround the plain; 
and, (3~ the continuation of the high Mongolian plateau 
which makes up the Barga District in the northwest. The 
plain of' Manchuria is also divided into three main natural 
divisions: (1) the plain of the Liao Hiver, (2) the plain of 
the Sungari River and its trmbutaries, and, (3) the western 
plain of interior drainage including Eastern Inner Mongolia. 
The po~u1ation of Manchuria at the present time can 
not be accurately estimated, because an aacurate census of 
these provinces has never been taken. APIJroximately, how-
ever, the latest papulation count reached in the neiehbor-
··) hood of 30,000,000 people, including l,l80,UUO aliens, made 
up of 800,000 Koreans, 2BO,uODJapanese, and 100,000 Russians. 
The density of population is about fifty-three people per 
--· ·- -- =-=--=-~=~==~' 
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square mile. 'l'hose who have already established their homes 
in this area feel it more than ever' their home land since 
the great railway system has brought modern enterprise, 
education, and civilization into chese provinces. Every 
spring about 450,UUO Chinese migrate from Shantung to work 
on the Manchurian farms; after the harvest about 330,000 
return to their homes and the rest of them remain there and 
find permenant employment. (2) 
Becatse of its natural resources, Manchuria has been 
called the "Garden of China 11 • With its rich soil, most of 
o.l_ 
the region is very productive. The principle crop in 1895 
was the soya bean, large quantities of which were exported 
south into China. It was only after 1890 that China began 
to import Manchurian beans, the bean being used for food 
purposes, the oil for sauces, and the cake for fentilizer. 
Since that time China has become an increasingly important 
market for the bean. In addition, Manchur•ia produces millet, 
kialiang, wheat, and other cereals. By 190U it was already 
evident that the country could be looked to as a granary for 
the future. In adaition to its agricultural productivity, 
Manchuria possesses tremendous wealth in timber and is rich 
()._ 
in minerals, including coal, iron, and gold. SuchAdomain 
was well worth the struggle to gain or to retain. 
( 2) "Chinese Colonization and the Developement of Manchuria~~~ 
Kejoto Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
Honalulu, 1929, p. 53. 
A SHORT CHAPTER ON 'l'HE HIS'l'ORY OF MANCHUhi.ti. 
The beginning of Manchurian history is lost in antiq-
uity; much of the early history of che vast district is 
only an uncertain legend.(3) It was said that thousands of 
years ago, the Koreans were the first se"Gtlers of the coun-
try, while the Manchus and the other peoples came later. 
Consequently in the tenth century, hostilities were carried 
on during the Chow dynasty (1133- 255 B. C.), the Tang 
dynasty (618 - 907 A. D.), and the Sung dynasty (960 - 1280 
A. D.). But the Manchus were the most powerful and persisted 
the longest. 
In 1260, for the first time, Manchuria took its place 
in history. Genglis-Khan, the dreamer of the world empire, 
conquered the territory and established his empire there. 
In 1644, the first Manchurian emperor of China remov-
ed his capital from Mukden to Peiping and established the 
lvlanchu. dynasty in China. Because of the strong influence 
of the Chinese philosophy, literature, and civilization, 
the Manchus were assimilated with the Chinese. Th1•ough the 
process of intermar•riage, the Manchus have united volunta-
rily with the Chinese race. Consequently in language, cus-
toms, traditiibns, and sentiment, China and Manchuria ane 
one. In social and political thinking the Manchus and the 
6hinese can not be distinguished. 
(3} Kwan, "History of Manchuria", Chap. I, Canton, 1928. 
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As the Manchus dynasty established itself on the throne 
of China in 1644, the historical claim of China to sovereign-
ty over Manchuria is nearly three hundr•ed years old. Since 
the Sino-Japanese \~ar of 1894, the administrative system of' 
Manchuria has been reorganized by the imperial government, 
and shortly after the close of' the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904, the Imperial govennment brought the administration of 
Manchuria into line with that of China proper by appointing 
a viceroy with full power over each of the provinces. 
~a th recent years Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria 
has been recognized by the Great Powers. On July 13, 192~ 
in the House of Commons, Sir Austen Chamberlain declared 
that Great Britain t3onsidered Manchuria a part of China.(4) 
On May 21, 1928, Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State 
of the Lnited States, stated to the press, "As far as the 
.United States is concerned, Manchuria is essentially Chinese 
soil". (4) 
While the h1anchus were establishing their empire in 
Manchuria, Russia invaded their oriental neighbor•s in the 
Amur River. She defeated her op~onent and acquired the 
Maritime Province with the port of Vladivastock. From that 
time on, Russia decided to gain a foothold in the Far East. 
After long years of struggle, in 18~5 she'secured the hail-
way coneession in Manchuria and leased the Kwantang Province 
ror a period of twenty-five years. Having got into Manchuria, 
(4) Foreign Policy Heport:"Basis Treaty Issues in 
!ilanchuria aetween Japan and China .'ForeiO'n u 
?olicy Associa.tion Incorporated ifol iJII I~o. 21 
December 1931. 
5 
Russia appointed Admiral Aleksyiev as Russian governor in 
the l''ar East. Later Aleksyiev took up civil and military 
rmles from Port Arthur on the Yellow Se~ and constructed 
a great railway through Manchuria, across Ji.sia, and straight 
into St. Petersburg. 
As the rtussian expansion in Manchuria developed, 
Japan viewed the situation with alarm and decided to keep 
all the Russians out of 11lanchuria. In 19U4 the crisis came.) 
and the Russo-Japanese war was fought in South Manchuria. 
In one year of fierce struggle, Port Arthur was seized and 
Russia was defeated. In 1905 the freaty of Portsmouth was 
signed and all of Russia's Kwantung Territory and the south-
ern portion of the Manchuria Hailway were transferred to 
Japan. That vJas the story of the coming of the Japanese. 
Since the war vvi th Russia, Japan has looked. upon Manchuria 
as a potential colony. tJl timate conquest on Manchuria has 
always been uppermost in the minds of all Japanese milita-
rists and politicians. The only point upon which they seem 
to disagree is wgether they should adopt a "moderate" or a 
11 postbti ve "policy. l.mfortuba tely the Late I' 'l'anaka and his 
associates were strong advocates of the latter. Thus they 
authorized the dispatch of troops to Manchut•ia in the 
Autumn of 1901. 
6 
:ECONOMIC CONFLICTS IN M.ANCHUHIA 
Manchuria is one of the great pioneer belts of ~he 
world. It is considerably larger than the whole Japanese 
Empire. It is a very great geographical ar·ea in the agri-
cultural s~age of development for a population of 30,000,000, 
of which three-fourths are engaged in agriculture, and of 
which ninety par-cent are Chinese. As a pioneer area, the 
broad plaine of central Manchuria, the fertile river valleys, 
the navigable rivers, and the mountains,highly mineralized 
and forest-covered,make this a section of present and pouen-
tial food and mineral production. 'fhese facts are of vital 
importance in any economic interpretation of Manchurian 
politics. According t!b the report of the Kuowen ·'JJeekly, we 
can see that the economic characteristics of Il'1anchuria not 
only -give it importance in the food and population problems 
of China and Japan, but also form the chief source of con-
flict between these two nations. (5) During the last three 
decades) Manchuria's wealth has been the cause of many series 
of troubles with Russia and Japan. In recent years, the 
situation has become more complicated. It is not only a 
battle ground for Chinese, Japanese, and Russian competition, 
but it has also become a fov~ ~t international interest. 
Political scientists have been predicting that 0he Manchurian 
conflict will be the cause of another world war. 
(5) Kuowen Weekly, Vol. IV, No. 39, 1931. 
7 
Densely populated as Manchuria is, it is, however, 
capable of absorbing from two to three times its present 
thirty million.(6) In the northern part of Manchuria, althoughi 
about twenty-seven .million acres of land are now under culti-
vation, yet it has at least an equal amount of uncultivated 
i\ 
land in this area. At the same time, becailse this area is a 11 
I 
potential producer of great crops of cereals and beans, es- 1 
ll 
pecially soya beans, Manchuria becomes a natural outlet for !i 
il 
the surplus$ population of such provinces as Shantung, where ~ 
the density of population is from seven to eight times bhat j 
., 
of Manchuria. In 1925 the Chinese at Mukden began to increase j 
production and to create a new source of taxable wealth. I 
Following that_year,the Chinese government intended to co-
operate with Japan for economic success in 11ianchuria. For-
tunately the idea was sound. The broader-minded group of 
Japanese politicians and statesmen held the view that Japan-
ese economic success in Manchuria would depend upon the 
principle of closer cooperation wd>th the Chinese. 'l'hey also 
believed that the increase of Chinese population in Manchuria 
would mean an improved market for the Japanese manufacturers. 
But on the other hand, another Japanese grou~ felt that the 
principle of cooperation would be a final blow to the Japan-
.. 
ese agricultural colonization in Manchuria. 'l'hus they vision 
political danger in the future when Manchurian agriculture 
and industry become less dependant on Japan. 
{6)~Problems of the Pacific: 1929, University of Chicago 
.Press. 
8 
Of ~hese two groups of opinion, most students of po-
litical science agree with the first group. In ~he first 
place, a highly industrialized countfy like Japan can really 
support many more people per square mile than an agricultur-
al country like China. Japan may need a population outlet in 
the future, but at present, her problem of overpopulation 
is not so pressing as tha~ of China.(7) As a matter of fact, 
about 500,000 Chinese have migrated to Manchuria each year• 
for the last six years, and for years to come, China must 
depend on Mancguria for food and as a population outlet to 
solve her problem of famine and overpopulation. In the sec-
ond place, Manchuria is now, and is destimed to remain,a 
territory populated ninety per cent by Chinese, which sug-
gests that ultimately only a Chinese political. regime can 
eurvive in Manchuria. In the third place the Japanese are 
unable to compete with the Chinese who are presumed to have 
a much lower standard of liuing than the Japanese farmers 
in Manchuria. More fundamantal factors are the refusal of 
the Japanese to migrate unless under artificial stimulus, 
and the obstacles to Japanese land acquisition. Japan may 
argue that her food problem is growing more serious, but this 
should no~ be confused with a population problem, because 
Japan has not so much to fear from lack of arable land for 
hOt 
food production~ as she contends.(8) Thus it isAnecessary 
(7) Stanley K. Hornbeck,"Contemporary Politics in the Far 
East 
------~,--,- "-- -- -,",---,-~rsr·nasu ,=--profes'sor'~or~'Yoiyo'~imper-ial- uni ver;i ty~- drmv ~~a' 
pessimistic conclusion that Japan 1 s future food and pop 
ulation problems are based on land utilization alone 
but these views should be tempered by the experience' of 
Great Britain and Belgium. 
9 
'. 
for Japan to lease or purchase land in the interior of 
Manchuria for her people to get food-stuffs. 
Another important factor in M~nchuria is mining. 
The vast northeastern region of' Manchuria has always been 
famous for its mineral resources. According to the estimates 
of mining experts,(9) the coal deposits for the whole of 
Manchuria are in the neighborhood of 2,925,ouo,ouu tons, and 
the total output of all the active coal mines in this region 
is 10,040,652 tons. With the exception of the Fushun and 
Gentsi mines, managed by the Japanese, and the mines at 
Tenshi, Muling, Chalanner, and Soatookou, run by both Chin-
.ese and foreigners on a cooperative basis, the collieries 
are entirely under Chinese operation. 
From a political point of view, no Manchurian mineral 
product is more important than coal. After the Japanese ac-
quired the i:iussian-controlled mines at :B'ushun, and for more 
than thirty years,it has become more and more significant. 
From 1927 to 1928, 7000,000 tons of coal were taken out from 
this mine. 'l'hus the South Munchuria fWilway values its in-
vestments at over $50,000,UOO. On account of this sole im-
port ant colliery, Japan undertakes to J?l'otect he!' interests 
by means of force. But on the other hand, the Chinese govern-
ment realizes that the Manchul'ian coal is more essential to 
the economic life of China than to that of Japan. China needs 
it because it is essential to support the industrial structmre 
{9) 11 China 1 s ~fforts in Developing h1anchuria 11 , p. 28, 
'rhe Northeastern Affairs l\esearch Institute, May 1932. 
in Manchuria, while Japan needs it only for revenue. 
Japan may argue that the Japanese coal production is annual-
ly in excess of imports, but this excess of imports is fre-
quently caused by artificial factors in the coal industry 
and not by a dearth of the home product or lack of reserves. 
(10) Thus the Chinese suggest that if Japan had ap~roached 
China with a genuine spi~it of friendliness and cooperation, 
China would be willing to advance common welfare between the 
two nations. But Japan, instance after instance, uses force 
rather than reason against the Chinese mining interests • 
. 'rhat is the real cause of conflict between the two nations. 
fhe Far East is especially poor in iron ore, having 
only 3.2 per cent of the known reserves of che world. Of 
these about one-fourth of this meagre supply is found in 
Manchuria, and the ore is very pool' in net content. Accord-
ing to the expert opinion of Boris P. Torgasheff, the iron 
reserves in South Manchuria will be near exhaustion in ten 
years.(ll) Considering the size of Manchuria and its increas-
ing industrial needs, it not only has no iron to spare, but 
will soon have to import iron and steel from outside. Thus 
Manchuria remains,of course, primarily a buyer rather than 
(10) Dr. Kinosuke, director of the Imperial Geological 
survey of Japan, has placed the "actual reserve" at 
nearly 1,000 million tons. 
Also c. Walter Young's statement in the Jmnals of the 
American Academy of Political Science, Nov. 1930 
11 
(11) 11 China 1 s Efforts in Developing Manchuria11 
. ---c-7C~"''~~cc·co~-~~--=-==co="-:r;p.e,~}~9~thw_es :te.r>n=Jtf~:.~~.r~s-~Re seBJ:>~h. ~]1S ti tu t e I May __ :I_~32_ .. - ~ .~ ... 
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a producer of iron and steel.(l2) With probable future indusp 
trialization in China, there is apparently no more than enough 
iron for her own use. Unfortunately most of r.he iron ore is 
in the hands of the Japanese. F'or instance, the Anshan and 
Tenhsihu mines combines produce nine-tanths of all the iron 
ore obtained from Manchuria, but both of them are under 
Japanese control. When the Chinese government claims, with 
very good reasonathat China has the first hand upon the nat-
ural resources of its own soil, Japan protests.(lS) That is 
another cause of conflict betv1een the two nations. 
The gold deposits in Manchuria are the richest in the 
\ 
country. 'l'here are seven gold collecting ·bureaus established 
in Kirin, ~ne gold mining corporation in Hsinchu, and a few 
small gold mines in the big cities. The total _output of 
these gold mines is about 10,735 .kilo q Y ~h~. Besides 
there are no less than thirty places where copper mines are 
to be found in 1v1anchuria. The most important places are 
Taing-Shih-Chu-Shan, Tau-Shih district, Yeachih district, 
Fenahi district, and Liaoning. Its annual output totals 
about 170,700 tons. lv'los t of these copper mines are under 
the control of the Chinese government. But Japan claims 
that she has special interests in iVIancguria. She ought to 
share in the Chinese corporations) but China refuses. That 
is the third cause of the conflict between the two nations. 
The world struggle for foreign markets, essential to 
( 12) Herhert File:' Europe, 11 The World 1 s Banker" 
(13) W. vj. Willoughby's statement in the North Junerican 
Heview of August, 1923. 
:i 
.I 
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the modern surplus of capital and manufacture, has its.Man-
churian phase. For a quarter of a century Japan has been 
trading with China. Since 1908 her trade has increased eight-
fold, as against a fivefold increuse for the United States 
and Russia.(l40 Again China also had 90% of the foreign 
trade of' Manchuria in the same year) andl 56% in 1927. Down 
to 1928, the total foreign trade of .Manchuria was about 
:i\i443,000,000. The chief items of Manchurian trade are agri-
cultural products. In 1929 the exports of beans, bean oil, 
and bean cakes made up 70)~ of Manchuria's exports, millet 
constituted 4%, Kaaling, 2-~ and timber und hides, 2~. In 
short) agricultural products made up 86/o of Manchurian trade. 
In the same year the imports also show that cotton and tex-
tiles made up 25%, wool products, 4%, clothes, food, and 
other da~ly necessities, 28%, s~eel, iron, machinery, elec-
trical materials,cars, and petroleum, 15%, and other mieael-
laneous articles,. 28/~. As Manchurian trade increased, Japan 
decided to take over Manchuria with the policy of ecomomic 
penetration. In 1924 when the Chinese government found out 
the secret and entered into fair competition with Japan, 
Japan tried to keep all the Chinese merchants out of Man-
churian commercial cities. While fighting for their rights, 
the Chinese people continued to do their business in Man-
churia. That is the vital economic situation which is bpund 
to affect diplomacy for years to come. 
( 14) C. F'. Remer, 11 'l'he Foreign 'l'rade of China11 , p. 239 
Shanghai, 1926. 
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IN'r:E.RNATI0NAL ABPEC'l'S 01<1 11HE CHINESE E.hS'l'ERN .R.H.ILWAY 
M.anchurian diplomacy has been called railway diplo-
macy. In 1898 the building of the southern branch of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway to Port Arthur,combined with the 
lease of Liaotung to Russia, furnished the principal cause 
of the .Russo-Japanese War of 1904. /igain, from 19U5 to 1912, 
the building of ~inese railways caused international diplo-
matic controversy. Furthermore, from the Washington Confer-
ence of 1921 to the present time, Manchurian railways have 
been the chief concern. Of these 1uanchurian railways, no 
railway in the world has caused so many and such a variety 
of international entanglemants as has the Chinese Eastern 
Railway. It was born in an international sec1·et plot, and 
from the day of its birth to the present time it has con-
I q; \l 0 
sistently lived up to its heritage. In 1880, Russia adopted 
a policy of colonization in the Far East. She organized a 
b~1L«~cracy in St. Petersburg with the object of securing 
the right from China to establish a direct line of railway 
to Vladivstok and the Gulf of Pechile. After the war of 1895 
her opportunity eame. 'vvhen Japan drafted the terms of peace 
on the basis of the cession of theJLiaotung Peninsula, Russia, 
Germany, and l<'rance called for a joint intervention. They 
stated that 11 the possession of the peninsula of Liaotung, 
claimed by Japan, would be a cdmstant menace to the capital 
14 
15 
!I 
'I 
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1 ~ 
of China, would render illusory the independence of Korea, 
and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of 
II 
the Far East.(l5) Finally Japan was forced to relinquieh 
:I 
. 'I 
II 
II 
:I 
I' 
:I 
:I 
Li&otung in return for an additional indemnity. Having plAced ~ 
il 
!I 
I' 
ii 
the lv1anchurian emperor and Li Hung Chang under obligation 
to Russia and convinced &hem of the necessity of Russian 
friendship in the face of a victorious and aggressiue Japan, 
il 
Russia proceeded to claim its compensation. Consequently in :: 
May, 1896, Li Hung Chang, Chinese m in1 s ter of Fore 1gn Affairs II 
to Hussia, signed a treaty in st. Petersburg in which both 
nations agreed to form a military alliance against Japan. 
Four mon&hs later, Russia obtained the right &o construct 
and operate a railway from Manchouli,on the wes&ern border 
of Manchuria,to Pogranichnays,on the eastern border. In 
l•larch, 1898, the Russian government leased the southern 
portion of the Liaotung peninsula for twenty-five years; 
and in July, China granted to Hussia the Chinese Eastern 
Railway Compamy. 
li 
\: 
·' i•
il 
When Russia was moving toward Manchuria and the Pacif- 'i !l 
'I ic Ocean, Japan viewed affairs with alarm. She realized that l1 
il 
Russia was not only taking root in Manchuria, but reaching \ 
;:11
1 
into Korea. 'l'hus Japan decided to use force to preuent the , 
Russian penetration. 'That vvas &he chief cause of the Russo- !I 
I' I 
Japanese Viar of 1904. Viith the conclusion of the 'l'ree.ty of : : 
:! 
Portsmouth, all Russia's rights in the railway south of' Chang-:i 
\\ 
( 15) Payson F. 'l'reat, 11 'l'he Far l!;ast", Chapter XXVII 
chun and the Hussian holdings in the Liaotmng Peninsula were 
transferred to Japan. 
After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan promptly strength-
ened her position in Manchuria. She organized the 5outh Man-
churia Railway Joint Stock Company on June 7, 1906) and 
started to work of reconstruction in April, 1907. The origin-
al Russian tracks were changed into the standard gauge, and 
double tracks were laid. And at the same time she also asked 
China not to construct any main line in ~he neighborhood 
parallel to the t:>ou thern Hail way. 'l'hus this South Manchuria 
Railv;ay Stock Company played the most important part in 
carrying out Japads program of exploitation in Manchuria. 
It does not only carry away the raw materials from 1danchuria 
to Japan and the manufactured goods from Japan to hlanchuri~ 
but it also engages in coal and iron mining, navigation, 
wharves warehousing, public utilities, education, and other 
enterprises. 'l'he success or f'ailul'e of this company means 
the success or failure of Japan's scheme of exploitation 
and colonization of hlanchuria. 
While the Japanese activities in Manchuria were.in 
progress, China was not idle. She was conscious of the fact 
that she should be mistress in her own ~enritory, that all 
of ~he disabilities imposed upon her by treaty should be 
eliminated, and that she should own and operate her rai~ 
ways.(l6) Consequently in the autumn of 1924, Marehall Chang-
(16) c. Walter Young, "hconomic Bases for New Hallways in 
J,Ianchuria", Clb.:limese :b.:conomic Jou1·nal, Peiping, Apr .192~: 
il 
l 
Tso-&in adop:bed the plan for railway construstion in Manchu-
ria. But when the Chinese govennment constructed the new 
0. 
railways linking up the three principAlfq cities of Manchuria, 
ed that the nevJ Chinese railv;ays would check the ac ti vi ties 
of the South !iianchuria Company. 'rhus Japan made every effortt 
to prevent China from developing a Chinese railway s'stem.(l7)~ 
Wheneuer China tried to build railvJays, Japan made protests il 
il 
i ~ 
on che ground that China had taken trni'fic away from the 
South.Manchuria hailway and had violated the Protocal of 
1905. Therefor China's attempt to build a railway has had 
a most difficult and stormy history. In some cases,China 
has had to borrow money from Japan; in other cases,China 
has had co change the route; and in some cases, China has 
been compelled to abandon the projected line all together. 
Yet the success of the Chinese ruilways in south 
1<lanchuria is beyond the expectations of the Japanese gov-. 
ernment.(l8) In recent years China has constructed the 'ra-
hushan-'runghiao line in southw~st Manchuria, and che Kirin-
He.ilung line north of Harbin. And the 'l1aanan-Solum railway 
in western Manchuria and the 'rsi tsihar-Koshan and its pro-
jeetion are also now limder constr•uction by the Chinese. 
Thus the Chinese railway system in Manchuria operates link 
by link, and will eventually have two independant port out-
lets, Newchwang, and Hulutao. It is puttine; up stii'f compe-
I' ,, 
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(17) c. Walter Young, 11 H.ailway Politics in Llanchuria", the 
China Weeldy Heview, Shanghai, April 18, and 23, 1927 ·i 
(18) "China's Efforts in Developing Manchuria'', p. 35, l'he 
Northeastern Affairs Hesearch Insti:bute, May, 1932. 
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tition to the Japanese re.ilways. In 1930 the freight charges 
were reduced by thirty per cent on the imganchi-'l'oanan, 
Gsupinghai-faonan line, and the Peiping-Mukden line. The 
result was that about half a million tons of cargo, which 
would have been exported at Dai~en by che South Manchuria 
Railway, was shipped through Yinkow via the Chinese railway. 
Adding to the unprecedented decline of silver, the receipts 
of the .South ivlanchuria B.ailway were decr·eased by 30,000,000. 
Yen. When the Japanese government viewed this situation, in 
alarm it decided to renew the 11 positive 11 policy in accordance 
with which it must use force to occupy Manchuria. When 
China was suffering the scourge of a ravaging flood, and 
when Europe was facing the world-wide depression, Japan 
invaded Manchuria wi:bhout warning. 
,. 
'£HE MAI'l"CHU1UAN CRISIS 
On September 18, the occupation of Manchuria by the 
Japanese military was known to the whole world. Briefly 
summarized, the grave situation was said to have been cre-
ated by the alleged blowing up of a section of the South 
Manchuria Railway at Huangkutun by the Chinese soldiers. 
Following the supposed event, the Japanese troops immediate-
ly started a surprixe accack upon the Chinese soldiers and 
marched into Mukden. Soon Japanese soldiers also occupied 
Yingchow, Nauling, Tungtating Changchow, and Kwanchingtze. 
B'urthermore the Japanese military forces landed in '£singtao 
and Chinchow. Consequently the whole terri tory of l1ianch1il.ria 
was entirely in the bands of Japan. With further aggression, 
Japan also moved to Jehol and took over that territory. 
Immediately after the occupation of i\Janchuria, lVlr. 
Shigeemitsee, the Japanese Minister to China, gave out an 
interview to the Chinese press of Peiping, and made a state-
ment that the "unfortunate inctdent was entirely started 
by the Chinese soldiers, and as no wa'J'I was expected by the 
Japanese troops, no special preparation had been made for 
the :brouble 11 • He also made sure that 11 the J-apanese officials 
were trying to localize the incident 11 • Later in spite of 
localizing the incident, the Japanese government zlaimed 
that, in order to fors~all the possible effects of the inci-
19 1 
·e 
dent.upon the safety of Japanese nationals in Manchuria, 
especially in view of the tense atmosphere that already pre-
vailed, it became necessary to take over Mukden and to dis-
arm the Chinese military units both there and at other points 
in Manchuria. 
It is not necessary at this point to recount in 
detail che incident of September 18, when a bomb is alleged 
to have exploded on the South Iiianchuria Railway line. Buf-
fice it to say that foreign newspaper correspondents in 
Mukden have stated that no neutrals or Chinese in Mukden 
accept the aapanese version of what happened in connection 
with the incident. Whatever provocation Japan may have had 
for her activities ·in Manchuria, there is general agreement 
. 
that the alleged occasion fob the beginning of operations was 
a flimsy and transparent pretext.(l9) 
According to an official statement issued by the 
Tokyo Forelhgn Office, it alleged that it was necessary for 
Japan to take "self-protecting measures'' since she could 
not 11 overlook such acts of the Chinese soldiers as destroy-
ing the Japanese railway 11 .(20) But let us ask, if the South 
(19) l!:ugene E. Barnett, 11 A Pew \len:cralizations Regm,ding 
the Manchurian Grisis 11 , 1932 
il 
(20) China Critic, Vol. IV, No. 39, Sept. 24, 1931, Shanghai 
It points out that a United Press repobt came from 1 
'l'okyo stating that today Mr. Morshima of the Asiatic 
Bureau of the Foreign Office left 'l'okyo for Mukden. 
He is carrying an important ins true tion to J:;ir. 
;~ Hayashi, the Consul-general at r.iukden, that Japan 
.! has taken action in Manchuria as a matter of self-
·:·::··:;;--;;"...,:-;·-;:-:::.:~.,...---:-.. -.;-;:.::::-_-..:...,.:::::--~=-==--.::--::::....deren-se ~-----::--;-__ ;: - -- ----- -- --= ---- -- ------- -- - ---:~.:-.-~-:~-------::---.::.::-~-: 
Manchurio. Railway is always carefully guarded and polieed by 
the Japanese soldiers, how could the Chinese soldiers have 
had the opportunity to get near the line? If the tracks were 
really destroyed, how could the Japanese trains still run 
over that line after September 18? Even if the charge were 
true, why should not the Japanese guards have disarmed the 
Chinese soldiers and asked the Chinese authorities for what-
ever satisfaetion they might deem proper? In other words, 
why should not Japan settle the case by diplomatic means, 
and why must they immediately resort to the occupation of 
Manchuria by military force without warning? Why must they 
seize the Chinese government buildings, imprison the import-
ant Chinese officials, and take possession of the· Mukden 
arsenal and wireless station•? Vihy should they send troops 
to •rsingtao? Is it, as Itir. Shigemi tsu said, a purmly local 
incident? 
It is, I think, generally agreed that back of the 
present military occupation by Japan of strategic points in 
~outh Manchuria, is Japan's long-cherished ambition to 
I 
establish an economic, if not a political hegemony in south 
Manchuria ani. inner Mongolia. One might go back to the Shim-
oseki· 'l'reaty of 1895 following -che Sino-Japanese War, to 
the Portsmouth Treaty following the Russo-Japanese War of 1905~ 
and to the Peking Treaty between China and Japan of 1905, 
to ~he notorious Twenty-One Demands served on China in 1915, 
and to the •ranaka Memorandum to the Emperor of Japan in 1927 
for concrete evidence of Japan's deepseated conviction of 
her imperial destimy in .ivlanchuria anl Inner Mongolia. 
Having studied the Japanese formign policy in relation 
to China, we can deduce thut the present occupation of Man-
churia by the Japanese troops was a premeditated and care-
fully planned act. In ~tA.flflO'rt:,·,l~ this :llt...Q.:o:v.~,,let us 
eonsider some facts. On September 15, General Honjo was sent 
to ivlanchuria as the comiilander of Japanese forces, and he 
immediately ordered a mobilization of his troops from Korea 
to Manchuria. 'l'hree days later, all the troops marched to 
iVlukden.(21) This attack on the Chinese city at Mukden start-
ed at 10:30 on the evenin~ of September 18, and the bombard-
ment and occupation of the principle cities along the South 
Manchuria Railway was completed within fourty-eight hours. 
Following that day, the Japanese military occupation has 
II 
:! 
I 
:t 
il 
li 
il 
:i 
~I 
I· 
,I 
:I 
I 
I! If 
II 
:I 
•I 
il 
extended to 'l'sitsihar and Harbin on the no:.vth, the Great Wall 1\ 
'I I. . , 
on the south, Inner Mongolia and Jehol on the west, and the 
Korean border on ~he east - an area of over 20J,OO square 
miles. In the occupied area, the Chinese standing army and 
police,who had been ordered not to resist, ha\e been dis-
armed; Chinese officials and private citizens have been 
arrested and put to death; Chinese administrative organs 
have been destrmyed; Chinese educational institutions, 
banks, and private businesses have been taken over or closed; 
( 21) "'rhe Manchurian Situation 11 , China 1 s Society, New 
York, 1931. 
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and a great deal of Chinese property has been destroyed. 
And today Japan has already set up her own political admin-
istration and rules the territory through her own puppets,~ 
Poyi, who are mominally the officials of the so-called in-
dependant government. She has also taken over private busi-
nesses and industries and has set up an economic structure 
of a permenant sort for the exclusive control of all the 
resources, industries, and trades. In other words, such 
swift occupation and control of l•ianchuria would have been 
impossible without advanced planning. 
Aside from the aboue facts, the occupation of Man-
cguria by the Japanese military was precipitated by the 
increased tension occasioned by two events of the past sum-
mer. One was the Wan Pao Shan incident; the other was the 
Tsinan incident. In the beginning of July, a group of 
Chinese farmers tried to oust some Koreans at Wan Pao Shan 
who were digging an irrigation ditch without the consent of 
the Chinese land owners. On July fourth, an anti-Chinese 
riot, which was instigated by the J&panese, began, and a 
considerable number of Uhinese farmers were ruthlessly 
slaughtered by the Japanese soldiers. Not long after that, 
more than a hundred Chinese were killed. Before the inci-
dent could be settled, the alleged murder of Captain Nak-
amura, who had gone into Inner l'~Iongolia on military duty, 
was magnified and capitalized by the Japanese military and 
23 1 
press, and the Chinese troops were being secretly mobilized 
and sent into Manchuria.(22) 
Since the war with Russia in 1904, Manchuria has 
constantly been in the minds of Japanese militarists and 
poli~icians. The only point upon which they seem to disagree 
icy. Before 1928 Japan still held to the"moderate 11 policy, 
but after 1928 the policy was changed. When the Chinese il 
!I national army marched to Peiping and united China as a whole, \ 
Japan was alarmed. Then Tanaka authorized the dispatch of 
troops to Tsinan during that summer> and tried to prevent 
the Chinese from organizing the Na~ional ~overnment; but 
they failed. 
Immediately after the occupation of Manchuria, Japan 
appealed to the world, saying that for her self- defense it 
was necessary to send troops to protect her nationals and 
interests in f,ianchuria. 'l'hus on the twentieth, I.lr. Morshirua 
of the . .i1.siatic Bureau o~ the Foreign Office left 'l'okyo for 
Mukden with the object of carrying the important instruc-
tion to 1\JI>. Hayashi, the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden, 
that Japan should take the position of self-defense.(23) 
How wonder·ful the Japanese Foreign ·office must be, in order 
to be able to comprehend the situation in Manchuria from 
'l'okyo even better than the Japanese Consul-general v;ho is 
there in person and right in the midst of the trouble! 
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' ( 22) Kuowan Vjeekly, Vol. IX, No. 1, Peiping, 1931. 
( 23) See :B'ootnote 19. 
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What a wonderful Consul-general they have thAt needs to be 
L 
informed from 'I'okyo ~ 
It is, I think, generally agreed that the plea of 
self-defense by Japan is without justification. In the f~rst 
place, Japan's population and inuestmentsoutside the treaty 
area are very small. It is impossible for a large number· of 
Chinese soldiers to attack. In the second place, except for 
outlying areas, Manchuria has been free from bandi:bry and· 
civil disturbances. There was no evidence of a charge which 
would threaten Japanese lives and property.{24) In the third 
place, if the Japanese had evidence of any plot of atLack 
on them, they would have made it public long ago. 'l'hey have 
not done so, but have talked only in vague and general terms. 
Japan might have made more sinful accusations of China, but 
she has failed to prove them. In the fourth place, the statis 
tics show that the Japanese nationals in China have been 
much safer than haue been the Chinese nationals in Japan. 
The total number of Japanese civilians killed in China dur-
ing the last ten years. up to the recent in~asionJ is less 
r.han half the number of CAinese civilians killed in Korea, 
which is directly under the control of the Japanese military 
and political authorities. In the fifr.h place, foreign ob-
(24) Harry Hussey, "l~'lanchukuo in Helation to World Peace 
'l'hings 'that Were Not 'l'olci in the Heport of the 
Commission of Inquiry11 • , 
'l'he author points out in his summary that nit is clear, 
that Manchuria was not, up to the time of the Japanese' 
invasion in September, 1931, the unhappy, bandit-in-
--~--~----=-=::=-~--~:==~=--~=~-.t:'~-~t~e-9:, __ _}~[1-~- 9-_~s()rganized_ country which the Japanese 
; would have us believe; nor was its government the in:.: 
efficient, corrupt, and bacmvard organ which interest-
ed parties have tried to picture to the world". 
servers would agree that the Japanese nationals and interests 
are always safe. Mrs. Slade, prominent American citizen and 
'I ij 
delegate to the conference of the Institute of Pacific Rela- ~ 
:I 
'I 
tions, said in a public address in New York city on hlarch 10, ~ 
1932, "From .SeptembeD eighteenth to November twentieth when :1 
'I 
-I 
I left China, no Japanese subjects were disturbed in China. 11 (2S)i 
:I 
After the military occupation of v:ukden, the Japanese i 
promptly made plans to attack the remaining cities. To avoid 
the censure of worlti opi~ion, they first planned to entrust 
this work to Chinese bandits with the help of Japanese staff 
officer·s and amuni tions. { 26) The bandit chief to whom they 
entrusted the task was Sin Yin-Chin, who had long been under 
Japanese protectiona~was living in the Japanese section of 
Mukden during the incident of September lb, 1931. Consequent-
ly on October 19, definite terms of cooperation were arrang-
ed between Shigetaro Kuraoka, the Japanese chief representa-
tive, and Lin; and the so-called "Headquarters of the North-· 
eastern People's Self-defence Army", with Lin as its chief, 
was drormed. On the same day, Kuroak was appointed adviser to 
this 11 J.U>my 11 • On October 20, Lin VJas proceeding to attack 
Panshan Cmty, but on November 4 he was killed by his own men 
who had joined him in the belief that he was really figh~ing 
for the people's cause, but realized later that he was only 
a Dool of the Japanese. 
Japan appeals to the worlti saying that it is necessary 
{25) New York Times, March 11, 1932. 
~26) "Japan and Banditry", 'l'he Nor the as tern .tiff airs 
Research Institute, 1932. 
26 
to suppress the Chinese bandits in order to maintain peace 
and oraer in !tlanchuria, but she does not tell the v1orld that 
mar1y of che bandits in Manchuria are of Japan 1 s own making. 
In spite of carrying through the Japanese plan to attack the 
Chinese cities, these bandits, who receive supplies from 
Japan, make war on the Japanese. These bandits though so-
called by the Japanese, are not the regular outlaws whose 
chief occupation is their depredations upon innocent people, 
but rather patriots who derive more joy from harassing the 
Japanese than their own country. 
In order to affirm their position in Manchuria, the 
Japanese made a third appeal ~o the world, pleading that 
the control of possession of ~anchuria is vital to the ex-
istence of Japan, on the grounds of historical, economie, 
and military necessity.(27) It is not necessary at this 
point to give more details for argument. 'rhe greatest dif-
ficulty with the Japanese is that they think only of the 
national existenct and defence of Japan, while it never 
seems to occur to them that China has her needs too. What 
about the national existence of China, the national defense 
of China, the ecomomie requirements of China, and ~he strate-
gic necessity of Manchuria to China? 
In appealing to the world opinion in connection with 
the liranchurian crisis, Japan makes her appeal on ~he basis 
of what she euphoniously calls the famous Treaty of 1915, 
(27) K. K. Kawakami, :!Japan ::>peaks 11 , p. 9, The Macmillan 
Company, 1932. 
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\i The Lansing-Isgii Agreement, and the ":'.~onroe :Joctrine 11 of 
•I 
!\the Far ~ast. China, on the other hand bases her cnse on 
i: 
li such documents as the Open Door Policy, the League of 
il 
ilNations Pact, the Viashington Conference pact, and the 
:i , 
Ill~,. 11 p t :r..e ogg ac • 
>I 
!I j 
li As a matter of facts, the military occupation of ;·.Canchuria 
II . 
l;is a fla&,Tant violation of international lavvs and of specific 
jltreaty pledges by Japan. 
'~ 
By the treaty of Portsmouth(l9o5), Japan acc~uired from 
Russi a what is noV/ called the Kvmntung Leased Terri tory 
and the South I,Tanchuria RailYmy, together vli th all 
Rusian privileges connected therevli th. But in this 
treaty it does not provide that Japan has the right to 
operate her military in the territory. The Treaty of 
Portsmouth contains the follm'!ing provisions: 
"Article III- Japan and Russia mutually engage: 
(1) To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria 
except the territory affected by the lease of the 
Liaotung Pininsula, in conformity with the provisions 
of additional Art. I annexed to Treaty. 
(2) To restore completely and entirely to the exclusive 
administr~tion of China all portions of Manchuria 
now in the occupation or under the control of the 
Japanese of Russian troops, with the exception of 
the territor:y above-mentioned." 
".Article VII - Japan and Russia engage to exploit their 
respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commer-
cial and industrial purposes and in no wise for strate-
gic purposes." 
2. The Nine Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922 pro-
vides that: 
"Article I - 'rhe contracting powers, other than China, 
agree: 
{1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and 
the territorial and administrative integrity of' 
China; 
§2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed 
opportunity to China to develop and maintain for 
herself' an effective and stable government; 
(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectual-
ly establishing and maintaining the principlefl of 
equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of 
all nations throughout the territory of China; 
{4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in 
China in order to seek special rights or privileges 
which would abridge rights of subjects or citizens 
of friendly states, and from countenancing action 
inimical to the security of such states." 
3. The Pact of Paris Provides that: 
"Article II - The settlement or solution of all disputes 
29 1 
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or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin 
they may be, which may arise among them, s~all never be 
sought except bt pacific means. 11 
4. The League of Nations Covenant provides that: 
"Article XII - The members of' the League agree that if' 
there should arise between them any dispute likely to 
lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either 
to arbitration oD to inguiry by the Council, and they 
agree in no case to resort to war until three months 
after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the 
Council. 11 
5. Japan has violated treaty rights in Manchuria, even apary 
from the gross violation involved in the military occupa-
tion. Since Japan's righ~s in the leased territory rest 
, 
' 
on the original Russian lease which expired in 1923, and 
since since the Sino-Japanese agreement of December 12, 
1925, under which Japan built the Mukden-Autung Railway 
specifically states that the term of the concession above-
mentioned is to expire in 1923, Japan has absolutely no 
right to be in control of the Kwantung Leased Territory, 
including Dairen, Port Arthur, and part of the South 
Manchuria Railway between Mukden and Autung. 
Further discussion of Japan's action in Manchuria has 
shown that she has no justification for her case. In the 
first place, if Japan had real grievances which China refus-
ed to take up in negotiation, her proper course would be to 
appeal to bhe League of Nations under provision§ of the 
League Covenant to meet the case. Instead she launched sud-
den, unprovoked, and wide-spread military occupation in flat 
violation of her treaty not to use war as an instrument of 
national policy. In the second place, if Japan had a good 
case, she would have welcomed the impartial investigation 
when the League decided to ap~oint a neutral investigating 
commission. Instead, she did not only refuse the Commission, 
but also suppressed all the press in Manchuria which would 
bribg the true facts to the outside world. In the third 
place, if Japan did want to seek peace, she would have to 
agree to any date provided by bhe League for the withdrawal 
of her troops from ,(,lanchuria. But when the Chinese authori-
ties had announced repeatedly that they were ready to restore 
peace· and order as soon as the Japanese troops should with-
draw, the Japanese announced publiclythat the Manchurian 
situation was purely a Sino-Japanese affair; neither the 
League of .Nations nor the Kellogg- Pact signabories had any-
thing to do with it. Then she continued the bombing of the 
Chinese cities and advanced to Jehol outside of Manchuria. 
With regard to the legal status of the SinD-Japanese 
'I'reaty and Note of 1915, "Che Twenty One Demands may affect 
Manchuria in two ways. First, the '1'reayy provided that the 
lease of Port hrthur and Dairen and the leases of the Mukden-
'• 
'8 
-
Antung Railway were all extended ninety-nine years.Secondly, 
in notes accompanying these demands, Japan may claim further 
mining rights and priority of investment in South Manchuria 
and Inner Mongolia. 
Now whether the Sino-Japanese Agreement of 1915, re-
sulting from the Twenty-Une Demands>is valid or not is open 
to question. Appealing to the world, Japan claims that the 
treaty is made between Japan and ~hina. It is impossible to 
abrogate on any legal basis; if so, how many treaties made 
hand, holds the Sino-Japanese Agreement invalid within its 
rights on a str~ctly l~gal basis. 
1. In accordance with innernational law, a treaty must be 
(28) Without the consent and advice of the Chinese Par-
liament, President Yuan Shih-Kai exceeded his constitu-
tional authority in signing these agreements. Thus the 
so-called Twenty-One 0emands were never ratified by the 
Chinese legislative body, and on many occasions, succes-
sive governments have declared tham to be fundamentally 
null and void. 
2. The Twenty-One Demands contravene all principles of Inter-
national law and especially those of the Open Door Poli-
cy and the Nine Power ~reaty in which all the powers 
promise to respect the territorial integrity and admin-
32 
- -·- . --- ·--· - -·-- ---~~--~-co--··~-,--, taw-~~=~-~~-=~-~~~--=~~~-~~--·· '--~-"~--~-~- _, =-, -="-~-~~C<'--''-'-''=''--'·"·~==--~,,=coc:_=-
{28) G. G. Wilson, 11 Internationa~1 , P.2ll, Silver, Burdett, 
and Company, 1922. 
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istrative independence of China. 
3. China 1 s signature to the documents was secured by an ulti-
'natum backed by the threat of force.{29) 'rherefonit is 
inv&lid. 
4. It is generally agreed that the foreign powers hold this 
t~reaty inualid. J~fter the treaty was signed, the United 
States sent identical notes to China and Japan with the 
following comment on r,he implications of' the Twenty-One 
Demands: (3U) "'l'he Govei•nment of the United States has 
the honor to notify the uovernment of the Chinese Repub-
lie that it cannot recognize an~ agreement or undertaking 
which has been entered into between the Governments of 
China and Japan impairing the rights of' the Vni ted ::>ta tes 
and its cmtizens in China, the political or terriborial 
integrity of the Republic of China, or the international 
policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open Door 
Policy". 
With regard to the railway situation, Japan claims 
that China has failed to abide by the treaty agreement under 
which China is alleged to have bound herself not to build 
railroads paralleling the South hlanchuria .iline. (31) On the 
other hand, China can explain that she was not ignoring 
conditions stipulated in an agreement. Prior to the Russo-
Japanese War in 1905, the Ma11churian l:Wilway system was 
practically controlled by Russin. It had a line running· 
( 29) G, G, Wilson, 11 International LavJ~ p .213. 
(3~0) Meng, 11 China .Speaks 11 , 'l'he Macmillan Company, 1933 
(01) H.oy H. J~gald, 'r, z. Koo and Joseoh p Ch b F'or · p 1 . ' .. • am erlain eJ.gn o ley l~ccociation, .Nev1 Yo:rk 1932 
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horizontally from ~anchuli to Vladivstok on one side, and a 
line running vertically from Harbun to Dalny. After the 
e Russo-Japanese VJar, a part of the vertical line from Chung 
chun to Dalny was transferred to Japan and become known as 
the South Manchuria Hail way. 'l1he hol'izontal line and the re-
maining part of the vertical line are still under the control 
of Russia. In 1924 when China began to develop her own rail-
ways in Manchuria, she built a railway linking up the three 
capital cities of Manchuria, Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar. 
In shape the railway is somewhat like a small circle, and its 
system is neither a horizontal, nor a vertical paralleling 
the bouth Ivianchuria Railway. { 32) Again, even if the Chinese 
railway system does parallel the bouth Manchuria Railway, 
China do~s not violate Japan's treaty right in Manchuria, 
because the agreement of 1905 between China and Japan is not 
a treaty but a protocol, which is used to explain the pro-
visio~ of a treaty. 
h 
II 
'I 
;! 
'I 
Before the occupation of hlanchuria, Japan declared that:! 
!I 
she was going to maintain the Open Door doctrine in M.anhhur- !J 
ia, b~t after she entered south Manchuria, she closed the 
door to other nations in violating the ~reaty of Portsmout~ 
which provides that Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not 
to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, 
which China may take for the development of commerce and 
industry in Manchuria. As a matter of fact, "experience has 
. 1 
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shown that in any region of China in which political conbrol 
is exercised by the Japanese, the tendency is for foreign 
trade other than J"apanese to diminish11 .(33) and t·hat 11 the 
Japanese tariff of the South £,1anchuria Hallway did and does 
discriminate against the Port of Newchang in favor of Dairen 
by inaugerating a system of rebates, of which, in the nature 
of things, Japan only can take advantage 11 .(34) Again, when 
Knox's plan was formulated upon a preliminary agreement 
between the Chinese government, the British contractors, and 
an American banking group for the construction of a line to 
connect the Peiping-lvlukden Railway at Chinchow and .Aigun, 
with the object of neutralizing the Manchuria Railways to 
develop the unified and scientific management of railWays, 
Japan induced Russia to take the leadership and responsi-
bility in rejecting the proposal. 
In the present case,more concrete details have shown 
that since the occupation of ~anchuria by the Japanese, all 
the foreign trade in Manchuria has been monopolized.(35) 
Foreign firms there, other than Japanese, are reported to be 
fleducing their staffs or closing their offices. 'rhus the 
Chinese Engineering company of Briton, which for many years 
has had merchants and agents in Mukden for the sale of glass, 
tile, and bricks has been closed;. the Chinese Engineering 
(33) George Bronson Rea, 11 Economic ~ffects of the Exten- , 
sian of Japanese Sphere of Influences in China11 , 1915.:1 
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( 34) stanley K. Hornbeclc, "Contemporary Politics in the 
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(35) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, "Some Plain Speaking with Regard 
to the Chinese-Japanese &ituation", J. H. Furst Go. 
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and Development Corporation of .America has been forced to 
transfer its Mukden .assis,tant-manager to Hangkow; the Ander-::7 
son Meyer and Company has been closed; and the rest of the :1 
:( 
foreign firms are remaining there only until they can settle i i! 
:I 
their accounts. ij ,, 
,, 
'I 
It has been argued by Japanese spokesmen, and especiali 
ly by Mr. Matsuoka, that,, 11 because a certain amount of dis- !I 
il 
order bas attended China's efforts to establish for herself ~ 
,i 
,( 
a government of the people, she is not entitled to rights 
which the other nations should respect, and, therefore, 
Japan should not be held strictly bound by such agreements 
as she may have made with China or with the other powers 
concerning China11 .(36) In other words, China is an unorgan-
ixed.nation to which the Covenant of the Leauge should not 
apply. 
In reference to Mr. Matsuoka's statement, it is 
worthy of note that it was not until Japan found that she 
was unable to support her cause before the League of Nations 
and before the world upon ethical and judicial grounds, that, 
as a last resort, she turned this at~ack upon China. As 
late as September, 1931, and only a day or two before the 
Manchurian controversy was brough-c before the Council of 
the.League, Japan cast her vote in favor of China's being 
represented upon the Council of the Laugue, but during the 
progress of that controversy before the Council, Japan in-
(36) See note 35. 
... 
sisted thet the League should not concern itself with the 
dispute, but should leave the whole situation to settlement 
by direct negotiations between herself and the government 
of China. If, as Japan now contends, China does not possess, 
and since 1912 has not possessed, a government that deswrves 
to be recognized by other governments, what possible con-
sistency was there in her insisting that only by dealing 
directly with that government could a satisfactory settle-
ment be obtained? 
Yes, Japan claims that China is not a well-organized 
nation, but let us aek what kind of a government Japan has 
to-day? Let us quote from the statement communicated by 
Dr. w. w. Yen to the Council of the League of Nations, for 
illustration. Dr. Yen said, "'l'he Japanese delegate speaks 
of a well-organized state. I am wondering *hether a state 
like Japan, with the army and navy running away and out of 
control of the government, is an organized sta~e. When their 
diplomats come to the Council table and give promises one 
after another, violated by the very next day, does that 
represent a well-organized government? The Japanese gave 
solemn promises to the governments of two or three great 
powers not to go to Chinchow, but in a few days they were 
there. Does that represent a well-organized government?"(37) 
Again, the Lytton commission Heport also treated 
the Japanese contention with the contempt which it deserved. 
(37} League of Nations Official Journal, 1932. 
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It pmints out that no one has denied that in recent times 
China has been going through a long and difficult process 
to a state of modernization, that ~he authority o~ the 
central government is perfectly effective, and that the 
administration, military forces, and finance are acquiring 
an increasingly national character. 
·Furthermore, it is generally agreed that during 
recent years, there have been progressing in China three 
great revolutions - a political revolution to establish a 
national government on the popular basis of the Three 
Principles and Five Powers system; an economic revolution 
to modernize methods of production and distribution; and 
a cultural revolution,which amounts to a genuine renais-
samce, to bring about changes in all fields of spiritual 
thought and idealism. Of course, China will not assert 
that within a few years she will overcome all the diffi-
culties, yet she can assert that she will make considerable 
progress. 'l'ake the judicial reform since 1905, for example. 
There are twenty~seven modern courts and twenty-one prisons 
in Manchuria today. 'l'he police system has been modernized, 
and western methods have been introduced into the cmvil 
administra~ion. 
Following the day of November sixteenth, the note of 
protest of the Japanese government against the anti-Japan-
ese movement in China was handed by 1~. Shigemitsu, the 
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ahinese minister, to Mr. l''rank Lee, the acting minister of 
foreign affairs of the Nationalist Government. Briefly sum-
marized,the note asserts that all forms of anti-Japanism, 
including the boycott, should be called off permenan~ly. 
I:b holds the Chinese government responsible for the hianchu-
rian situation, be~use ~he out~ome of ~he deep-rooted anti-
Japanese movement in China is conduc~ed as an instrument of 
national policy under ~he direction of the Nationalist Party. 
This charge is, of course, groundless, and Japan has no 
right to say that blame for the Manchurian ~ituation should 
be placed on China. In truLh,the anti-Japanese movement is 
conducted by the Chinese people in a peaceful manner. Since 
the duty o~ the government is only to maintain pease and 
order and to see that no Japanese lives and property are mo-
lested, such spontaneous demonstrations against Japanese 
imperialism on the part of the people cannot be suppressed 
by the government. 
Boycott is a ctvil right which can not be curtailed 
by: law.(3ti) The Chinese government may be able to control 
anti-Japanism contrary to law, but it connot force the 
people to buy somethinr; they do not want. Again, no one o.an 
hold that it has not been a measure of legitimate ~efense. 
Indeed, we can remember that in ~he ~nited States an impor-
tant group of highly responsible and distinguished citizens 
formally proposed no join China in boycott measures against 
(38) G. G. Wilson, "international Law", p. 226. 
Japan. Furthermore, the League of Nations has approved of 
ecomomic boycott as a measure of sanction against a recal-
citrant state.(39) If Japan would ask China to accept this 
principle, she would have to urge the League to renounce 
and denounce boycott first. 
On the other hand, Japan contends for the payment 
for railroads built with Japanese rnon~y, and for the recog-
nition of existing agreements for railway construction in 
Manchuria. Of course, the claim is absolutely unjustified. 
The so-called railway agreement which resulted from the 
series of Nishihara loans in 1918 was intended for indus-
trial purposes and the construction of railwqys. The money 
was never so used, however, but only appropriated for 
military need. On June 18, 1918, for instance, a contract 
was obtained by the Bank of Chosen and two other Japanese 
banks to construct a line between Kirin and Ruining, but 
this contract lacks such details as the total amount of the 
loan and the manner of service on the bond. Yet an advance 
of l0,0UO,UOU yen was made to Peking without restriction. 
Thus a loan of this nature, secretly obtained and privately 
dissipated for a false purpose, can hardly be recognized 
as binding on China. If Japan claims that such nefarious 
transactions can be upheld, then all the Chinese corrupt 
officials at any time can pledge the nation's future in 
eKchange for Japanese support. 
(39) Artivle XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations-, 
The Japanese government has made official announce-
ments of the Japanese Monroe Doctrine.(40) She bolas that 
she is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order 
in the Far ~ast, and that other powers have taken similar 
actions in the past. In other words, Japan draws a paral-
lel between its actions in i~Ianchuria and those of the United 
States in Mexico and South America. Centainly this is an 
unjustified doctrine. In the first place,the actions of 
Japan must be judged on their own merits according to the 
specifi~ background and circumstances. In the second place, 
times have changed and much progress has been made in inter-
national law and ethics. In accordance with the Nine Power 
'l'reaty, the Kellogg Pact, and the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, it is impossible for a foreign power to enforce 
peace by military occupation. 
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'I'he American Monroe Doctrine, as offici ally defined, ~~ 
is solely a policy or self'-defenee. It is lirni ted to express- I 
ing the opposition of the United States to any non-American !I 
state seizing terri to:i:y or political control in the hemisph-
ere. Unlike the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, it does not claim 
special interests, hegemony, or economic privileges. It does 
not use military force to induce the Catibbean republics to 
permit American capital to find profitable investment. 'l'he 
doors ar·e voluntarily vvide open. It does not possess or 
seek an exclusive economic concession in any Latin American 
!I 
,I 
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:I 
!I 
!I ij 
I 
:j 
II l] 
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'I 
I (40) K. K. Kawakami, "Japan Speaks", l;he Macmillan Co. 1932ii 
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Republic. The United States, at least, violated no inter-
national treaties. She acts only in accordance with the 
desires of the local population. When it has seemed neces-
sary to intervene in some revolution-tossed land, she has 
effected ~he necessary reorganization and has then with-
drawn. The Japanese Monroe Doctrine is differ~t. If it is 
judged by the action of ~he J·apanese government and the 
statement of many Japanese leaders, it has aimed to over-
throw the status quo im Manchuria to Japan's own advantage. 
&W 
THE SHANGHiil WAR 
While the attention of the vmrld was eentered on 
r~·!anchuria, Japan charged that the Chinese National Govern-
ment had induced the Anti-Japanese Society to attack the 
Japanese subjects in Shanghai. Following the supposed event, 
on January 27, Admiral .Shiozawa issued a declaration, appar-
ently on his own responsibility, announci~ his decision to 
take necessary military action to preserve peace and order 
in the Chapei district.(4l) Shortly after midnight, Japanese 
marines issued from the International 5ettlement and in-
vaded Chapei. Meeting with unexpected and stiff re:sistance 
from the veteran Cantonese force commanded by General Tsai 
Ting-Chai, the Japanese marines made no progress in the 
night hours. Thus, on January 29, Japan massed over four 
warships, 60,000 men, and over 200 military planes to invade 
Shanghai. Bombs dropped into Chapei by Japanese airplanes 
throughout January 31 set the area on fire. The Chinese 
civilians in Chapei were forced to choose between the bullet-
swept street and the spreaaing fire; the total number of 
deaths will never be accurately known. 
On February 2, the Gnited States and Greut Britaifu 
submitted a comprehensive peace proposal to Japan and China. 
'rhe principles 11ed nt :o of this proposal are as follov1s: 
cessation of all acts of violence; withdrawal of both 
Japanese and Chinese combatants from all points of mutual 
(41) Shanghai Time, Shanghai, China, January 27, 1932. 
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contact in Shanghai; protection of the Shanghai settlement II il 
·I 
by establishment of a neut1•al zone to be policed by neutrals II 
under consular authority; and prompt advances toward nego- II 
!! 
il 
tiation to settle outstanding Sino-Japanese controversies.(42} 
The proposal/ of peace by neutrals was accepted by China 
but was rejected by J&pan. As the situation went from bad 
to worse, the twelve members on the Council ~ade an appeal 
to the Japanese government to acknowledge· the Nine Power 
Treaty of 1922, but this appeal also fell upon deaf ears. 
Finally, as the result of the checking of the Chinese Route 
Jirmy, the truce was signed between China and Japan, but 
the case was still unsettled. 
The destruction of Chapei on January 29, 1932, was 
the turning point in the Sino-Japanese conflict. In the 
first place, before the Shanghai ~~ar, all the powers still 
held the attitude that Japan's claims might be justified 
and its military operation in China might not be an aggres-
sive action. After the outbreak of the ~hanghai War, all 
the powers realized that Japan had committed a similar act 
in Manchuria. Shanghai was an international port and an 
important shipping center for the war, yet Japan had unlaw-
fully brought the war to the front door of the Internation-
al Settlement and threatened the trade of all nations there. 
Manchuria is not an international port and is of less impor::r 
tance to America and European powers. VJhat could Japan do 
(42) Shanghai Time, Shanghai, China, February 3, 1932 
..___________ 
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there? Thus it would not be surprising that through eye-
wi:tmesses in Shanghai the world could be able to get a more 
vivid and truthful picture of the situation than in Iv1an-
churia. 
In the second place, before the War, the whole world 
believed that the Japanese government was under the civil 
authority. After the Shanghai War, the world realized that 
the Japanese government is under the contr·ol of military 
authority. When they went aoout their task so ruthlessly 
-1/.o-1-
and with such difficulty,heven the Japanese foreign office 
and the Japanese delegates to the Laugue have had consider-
.able difficulty in following the Japanese military opera-
tion for which they have been called upon to offer post-
mortem pretexts and explanations. 
In the third palce, the whole world realizes that 
the invasion of Shanghai by the Japanese military is a 
shattering shock to world opinion. For more that ten years 
people believed that international conflicts could be ad-
justed througJ:i~·democratic principles of the League. Japan, 
at the day of the Disarmament Conference, sent troops to 
Shanghai and made the political machinery of the League 
almost stop functioning. '1'he invasion of Shanghai did not 
only disclose the bankruptcy of the resDricted system of 
international law and agreement, but also destroyed all 
faith in the complicated system of pacts, protocols, and 
45 1 
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renunciation of' war. as an instrument of'"policy. 'l'hus Japan 
.QJ..Q not only brdmg about moral disaster in the V!Ol'ld, but 
also shattered the restricted group of the League support-
ers and the mass of mankind,which has been brought back 
from post-war dreams to pre-war realities. 
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)\1AliCHUKUO 
While the attention of the world was concentrated 
on Shanghai, Japan was consolidating her position in Man-
cbur~a. On March 9, 1932, the Japanese military authority 
put Henry Pu y·i on the throne of f,Ianchukuo, and confronted 
the world with an alleged 11 fait accompliu in I•lanchuria. 
Consequently this illegal government may, under the iron 
hand of Japan, claim the right to transfer rights and con-
elude treaties with Japan, if not eventually to incorpor-
ate itself as part of the Japanese Empire. 
After the proclamation of an independent Manchuria. 
at i1lukden, General Araki, Japan's Minister of the Army, 
announced that the independence of Manchuria is the desire 
of 30,000,000 who wish to be saved from China's war lords 
and given their fre~dom. It is the duty of Japan ~o support 
this new independent nation directly or indirectly in the 
early days. If one studies the history of the independence 
of Cuba or the formation of the Republic of Panama., he will 
not be surprised to find that Japan supports the progress 
of a government in Manchuria which is prepared to recognize 
and protect Japan's rights and interests and maintain 
friendly relations.(43) 
On the other hand, "Uhina has a very good reason to 
believe that the movement can by no means be regarded as an 
active and spontaneous expression on the part of the 
( 43) In answer to a question on the Independent G-overnment ·· 
from the 'l'okyo correspondent of the New York Times, 
General Araki made this sta~ement recently. 
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Manchurian people. Since the population of Manchuria is 
made up mostly of emigrants or the descendants of emigrants 
from China, we can believe that these people will always 
consider themselves sons and daughters of China. bince 
----~- ~-1 
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ninety per cent of the Manchurian population is Chinese, then 
the so-called independence movement can not be looked upon 
as an at~empt to assert the principle of self-determination 
on the part of the minority. Conclusively,it is altogether 
clear that, since it has always been the aim of the milita-
rists to create an independent but Japanese-controlled 
Manchuria as the first step toward annexation., the puppet 
government is entirely instigated b~ the Jupanese. 
How let have the facts. amly. 
After Yuan Chin-Kai, under the control of Japan, was instal-
led with ceremony by the Japanese as head on an independent 
provincial government in Mukden on 'l'uesday, a correspondent 
of the New York Herald Tribune quoted a conversation with 
Yuan Chin-Kai, the essential parts of which are us follows: 
111 They would have imprisoned me and installed persons who 
have no regard for Manchuria's welfare, if I had refused,' 
he said, explaining why he had accepted the post. 'I am 
trying to do my best for the Chinese and Go avert more 
serious trouble. I know the Japanese are trying their hard-
est to restore a h1anchu emperor, but I have nothing to do 
with it. When I assumed office, I had no idea that things 
... 
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would go so far. rhe Japanese immediately pressed me to 
negotiate a Manchurian settlement, but I refused and still 
refuse. I would like Chang Hsueh-Liang 1 s return, but that 
is now impossible. 
1
'l'he Japanese compelled me to do many things contrary 
to my wighes, including the ceremony of installation and 
the proclamation severing rela~ions with the regular Man-
churian government, but others might have done worse. 111 {44) 
On October 22, 1931 1 11 'l'he China Critic 11 also issued a 
statement proving that there was no such movement until the 
Japanese occupied Manchuria. It was reported that Pao Shen 
Yi, a leader of the Mongolian tribes, was supjJorted by 
Japan to create an independent movement in his tribe. Sev-
eral train loads of arms and munitions were handed over to 
Mongolian troops headed by the Japanese returned students 
at Sankusu on the night of October 2, at a small station 
near 'l'aonan on the night of the third, and at Ikusu on the 
night of the fifth. It was also reported that Prince Erl Han, 
who is at present living at Paiping, accused the Japanese 
in Mukden of offering him arms and amunitions on condition 
that he declare Inner Mongolia independant of China, and of 
forcing him to call a conference of the forty-eight princes 
in Mukden. 
( 44) Vic tor Keen, New York Herald 'l'ribune 1 November 15, 1931. 
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THE .A.H1.1.S EI,IBARGO 
While the development of the grave situation in Man-
churia was in proeress, the United ~tates of America adopt-
ed a resolution that she would bind hers~lf to prevent per-
sons under her jurisdiction from exporting munitions to any 
counbry or countries in which this action might promote or 
encourage the employment of force in the course of a dispute 
oD conflict between mations. {45) The object of this reso-
lution was to promote world peace by depriving the militar-
ists of arms and amunitions in the Far Bast, but it did not 
secure that ef1'ect. In the first place, since Japan 1 s ambi-
tion is the conquest of the whole of Asia as well as the 
subjugation of Europe and America, as outlined in ~he Tanaka 
lilemorial, ( 46) whether the United States exports any arms or 
munitions of war to her or not, Japan has a good preparation 
to carr'y out her scheme. Again, even if the Japanese do 
need the arms and munitions, they can get them from Europe 
without any trouble, because neither the Near Eastern 
nations nor the European nations have taken the same action 
as the United States. 
In the second place, if we do recognize that Japan 
has violated the three peace pacts and the Covenant of the 
League of Hations, our only duty is to stop Japan, or to 
protect China from the ruthless aggressor and from ultimate 
destruction. It is impossible to adopt a resolution to place 
(45} 72d Congress, 2d Session, Calendar No. S.J.Res. 299 
January, 1933. 
(46} This memorial was submitted by Tanak, the premier of 
Jepan to the Empe~or, 1927. 
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an embarge on both the aggressor and the defendor, or on 
just the aggressor. If we place an embargo on both, we are 
not only unable to check the aggressor, but we also weaken 
the defendor, who has less munitions, and encourage the 
aggressor to employ force in the course of the conflict. 
If we place an embargo on the aggressor only, it would mean 
a possible war with the aggressor,. and it is too cowardly 
for us to support the defendor only with a little munition. 
1 
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THE LEAGl.JE OF NATIONS AND l'IIiiliCHURIA 
after China presented the case before the League of 
Nations, efforts on the part of the League Council to re-
strict the possible consequences of the Manchurian outbreak 
were made·at three separate sittings. Briefly summarized, 
they were as follows. On September 21, 1931, Dr. Jlifr•ed Sze, 
~he Chinese representative, ap~ealed to the League of ~ations 
and invoked Article XI of the Covenant.(47) Thus the Council 
of the League was askedi to take an immediate step to prevent 
the further development of a situation which might endanger 
world peace; to reestablish then statue quo ante''; and to 
determine the amount and the character of such r•eparations 
as might be found due to the Republic of China caused by the 
Japanese military operations. lllr. Yoshizawa, the Japanese 
representative, om the contrary, held that the Manchurian 
situation was purely a Sino-Japanese affair.(48) Neither the 
( 47) League of Nations Official Journal, September 21, 19311. 
China invokes .iU'ticle XII of the League Covenant to · 
11 bring to the attcmtion of the Assembly br of the 
Council any circumstances whatever affecting inter-
national relations which threaten to disturb inter-
national peace or good understanding between the 
nations upon which peace depends 11 .. 
(48) League of Nations Official Journal, September 22, 193t. 
China agrees to the Le~gue inquiry but demands that 
the 11 status quo ante 11 be restored, wl).ile Japan in-
sists on direct negotiations. 
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League of Nations nor the Kellogg Pact signatories had any 
thing to do wibh it. Hense he insisted on direct negotiation 
between China and Japan, and defended Japan's action in Man-
churia on the ground of the necessity of protecting the 
Japanese nationals and their property. 
On Sep~ember 30, the Council of the Leqgue adopt~d a 
resolution in which Japan promised to withdraw her troops 
from Manchuria by October 14, and China promised to assure 
the safety of the Japanese nationals and intermsts. At the 
same time the Council appointed an international commission 
to look into the cause of the clash. In the interval, China 
kept her promise, while in spite of it, Japan continued to 
extend her military occupation. On October 14, the Japanese 
troops were still in ll'lanchuria. 
On October 13, the League Council proposed to invite 
the United Btates to participate with the Cpune1ill in con-
sidering the Manchurian dispute, but Japan rejected this 
plan and argued that the invitation was illegal, because the 
United S t:;ates is not a member of the League. F'inally by a 
thirteen to one vote, the United States was invi~ed, and the 
Council took an immediate step to invoke the Kellogp; Pact.(49) 
On October 17, the League issued a warning calling upon 
Japan to immediately begin the withdrawal of troops and to 
complete it by November 16. At the same time the League ar-
anged a permenant conciliation committee to aid negotiations· 
(49) League of Nations Official Journal, October 16, 1931. 
The League Council invites the United ~tates to its 
meetings. Japan objects and casts the only dissenting 
vote. 
October 1~, The Pact of Paris is invoked. 
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between the two nations. But on November 16, the situation 
grew worse rather than better. It was found that the Japanese 
troops were not only still there, but that they had also 
advanced to the rest of the Manchurian territory. 
Since China believed that the Covenant of the League 
and the Kellogg Pact would assure her protection from ruth-
less a~gression and ultimate destruction, she carried out 
every instruction of the Council. Thus throughout twenty-
two months of conflict all the Japanese nationals have lived 
unmolested and unharmed in the midst of Chinese territory. 
On the contrary, the Japanese troops are still in Manchuria, 
and the Council is making vain atte~pts to settle the case. 
How is this condition of af'fairs to be -explained? Why has 
the League of Nations failedY 
In the first place, to those who know the corridor 
politics and the machanism of the League, the failure of 
the League to solvethe Sino-Jopanese conflict in a speedy 
and sati§factory way could not be surprising, because the 
political organization of the League is not only too young 
and too weak for such a task, bu~ also too far away from 
Mancg.uria. 
In the second place, the most amazing thing about 
the present crisis is its very clarity, which has made it 
difficult. When the League found that the .Judicial position 
of China was far too strong and that her judicial right in 
54 
lier differences with Japan was far too clear, it was morally 
impossible to condemn China. On the other hand, the League· 
feared that Japan would withdraw from the Lmgue, and from 
the Council, and was therefore unwilling to condemn Japan. 
In the third place, if we observe international politecs 
very closely, we realize that the great powers are paralysed 
by their ovm interests. Whether this is tree ornot wecan not _ 
teihih. But there was a rumor that Japan and France had a 
secret agreement in 1928 in which France gave Japan a free 
hand in Manchuria. Since France is an.xious to take Indo-China 
she advises the Japanese to turn their eyes tov;ard Manchuria 
and assures them that there would be no obstacles placed in 
their way. (50) 
In the fourth place, it is generally contended that 
the Manchurian crisis is a part of a French plot. (51) 
Brief sunliilarized, the plan which has staggered some of the 
European statesmen has three stages as follow·s: (a) After __ the 
; forc:ceful occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese military, 
h , f t'ne Le!::.gue ·, (b) the long Chiaa places er case oe ore ~ 
adjournment of the Le~e gives Japan an O)portunity to 
consolidate her position; and (c) an invasion of the Russian 
boundry is made by askine IJihland to unite against Russia. 
(50) The China Critic, Vol. v, No. 3, page 66 
(51) The China Critic, Vol. v, Ho. L January?, 1932 
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If there is a war, France would be on the Japanese side. 
In the fifth place, one aspect of the difficulty 
may be due to the grean economic depression of the world 
in general, and to the absence of the United States in 
particular. Since Japan's position in the Council was very 
strong, it was impossible for the League to act without the 
United Stutes. Unhappil~ the United Stabes did not cooper-
ate with the League as well as she might have. When the 
League proposed to use its powerful weapons of the with-
drawal of ambassadors and of the economic boycott, the 
united States thought that these actions would mean a pos-
sible war with Japan. Thus, Japan was given the courage 
to take a free hand in lilanchuria. 
'Z?fO'ttm'RMPS 5!39 i111i 
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After Japan had set up the illegal government in 
Manchuria, the whole world awakened to the grim truth and 
refused to be hoodwinked by the Japanese. As the sponsor of 
the Nine Power 'i'reaty ami the Kellogg Pact, the United States 
realized that she had the moral obligation to assume the 
leadership in settling the Manchurian dispute. On January 7, 
1932, Sec~etary Stimson took the noble action of invoking 
the Anti-War Pact and the Nine Power· 1'reaty. In the note 
the government announced that the United States will not 
recognize any treaty or agreement between China and Japan 
which would impair the treaty rights of the United States, 
including these relating to the so-called Open Door doc-
trine and to the sovereign independence and territorial and 
administrative integrity of China, nor recognize any sit-
uation or agreement brought about contrary to the Pact of 
Paris. 
If the dispatch of the note had taken place at the 
beginning of the Japanese invasion of Mnnchuria, the Japan-
ese military operations would have been checked. Since 
world opinion at the beginning of the of the crisis was 
solidly against Japan, ~nd since ~he League council had 
passed the resolution to ask Japan for the wi thdr·awal of 
her troops, if to theBe had been added Stimson's note, the 
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Japanese military operation in ldanchuria could not have been 
justified as for defensive purposes, and a satisfactory 
solution of the Manchurian embroglio might have been reached. 
The chief reason why the United States government did not 
act earlier was the fact that a sufficient delay was neces-
sary to enable the i1l1lerican investors,who had an immense 
interest in Japan, to liquidate their holdings. Whatever 
might be the reason for it, the Chinese government does 
appreciate the American attitude toward the solution. 
From another aspect, if all the leading powers vJOuld 
be willing to take the same stand as the American government, 
the Japanese actions in J\1anchuria would likewise be checked 
and the foundations of world peace would be maintained. 
When the .American note reached tokyo, Japan had not yet 
taken Chinchow nor moved toward Jehol. If more nations had 
associated themselves with the Dnited btates in the same 
action, it would have established a peaceful solution. For 
instance, if all the Associated Powers had taken the same 
action,and the Japanese military action had stopped then, 
the question of Manchuria would be confined to l·Ionchuria 
alone. Unfortunately 1 Great Britain, F'rance, and the others 
were unwilling to associate and cooperate with the United 
States. 'l'hus they left the no~e ineffective. 
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THE ~T·riTUDE Olt' RUSSIA 
It is generally agreed that from the very start, the 
Russian government and the Russian people were deeply inter-
ested in the situation. Following the day of September 18, 
'~l'he Izvestia~ an official organ of the Soviet ~overnment, 
criticized the situation, saying that the Japanese occupa-
tion of Manchuria has failed to meet even a semblance of 
protest either from the League of Nations or from Washingtoo • 
It pointed out that Ueneva was satisfied with the state-
ment of the Japanese representative in telling of the entry 
of Japanese troops into Manchuria, and that the United 
States had made it clear to the world that she did not find 
in the operation of the Japanese troops anything contra-
dictory to the .Anti-War Pact. It also pointed out that the 
Japanese action must have been agreed upon by the other 
imperialist powers • .And finally it concluded, saying that 
the Soviet Government will closely watch the further devel-
opment of events in this Far ~astern hotbed of war,which is 
threatening new anti-Soviet provocations under which the 
imperialists may hide for the purpose of covering up their 
real intentions. 
"Provda", another official organ of the Central 
Committee and the Moscow Committee of ~he Communist Party, 
also made a comment that the Japanese imperialists had 
decided by fire and sword to get what does not belong to 
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them in a foreign counnry, with the object of completing 
their program of colonization. It pointed out that Japan 
made no refer·ence to lawfulness or self-defense in justi-
fying her aetion, and that the League of Nations, by its 
decision, had revealed itself as a weapon and organizer of 
wars of plunder for the suppression of weak and oppressed 
nations. 
In accordance with the above criticism, we can real-
ize that Russia has not been very sympathetic toward China 
so far as the present crisis is concerned, because her 
sharp protest against the imperialist powers was not for the 
benefit of China, but in her own defense. Since the War of 
1904, Russia has been planning to recover her special inter-
ests in Manchuria. If Idanchuria is in the hands of Japan, 
it means a new triumph for imperialism, and she will have 
no chance to get it back; but i~ Manchuria is still in the 
hands of China, she will have more chance to eztend her 
power in the Far East. 'rhat is the chief l'eason why Russia 
tries to keep the Japanese out of Manchuria. 
When the Japanese troops invaded Heilunghian and 
took by force the provincial capital, 'l'sitsihar, many 
people expressed the fear that by entering the area of 
Russian interests the Japanese military authorities would 
come into conflict with the Communist forces. But ~ob near-
ly two years Russia has taken no action. Why? Does this 
mmsrn rrrl 
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mean that the Russians are in sympathy with J-apanese imper- 11 
ialistic schemes, oa:l does it indicate that Japan has succeed- !I 
II 
ed in winning over her Communist neighbors? No, Russia ~ 
refuses to do anything about the :Manchurian embroglio, not 
because she does not know that the extension of Japanese 
activities north of the Chinese Eastern Railway is detri-
mental to her interests, but because she is now too much 
absorbed in the first and second diive year plans. ~rhus it 
is necessary for Russia to be patient and watchful for the 
opportune moment in the future to avenge. 
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THE LYT'l'ON REPORT 
The· Lytton Report on ~~Ianchuria is a remarkable 
document, extremely well written, well tempered, wise and 
just, and it completely upholds the Chinese case. ss to 
the outcome, there can be no doubt in the minds of impar-
tial observers, but it is refreshing to have a League Com-
mission lay down ten principles essential to a permenant 
peace between China and aapan, and elucidate these in a 
clear-cut, straight-forward, and eminently practical man-
new. Thus the Commission, besides starting with the posi-
tion that a settlement by the League must be just to both 
sides, declares that it must also have due regard for the 
interests of the Soviet Union, and must conform to the 
Covenamt of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty, 
and the Kellogg Pact. 
Deny everything~ Confess nothing~ Blame all on 
your opponents~ Blmsner and threaten~ In this fashion Japan 
responded to the Lytton Heport. In addressing the Cpuncil 
of the League, lVlr. Matsuoka unblushingly asserted, "We 
have violated neither the Covenant of the League, nor the 
Nine Power Treaty, nor the Pact of Paris ••••• We acted spon-
taneously in self-defense ••••• China and the independent 
government of Chang-Hsiao-Liang are themselves responsible. 
It was their doing,not ours, and it was done against out 
repeated and persistent warning." (52) 
(52) League of Nations Official Journal, October, 1932 
a, 
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In other words, all Japan's actions in Manchuria are 
defended as legitimate and imperativ~ measures of self-
defense. On the other hand, the League Commission, in des-
cribing the fateful events of September, 18, 1931, when the 
Japanese armed forces seized Mukden, says inequivocally 
that the bomb explosion of the night on September 18 "was 
not in its~lf sufficient to justify military action", ~nd 
that the seizure of Mukden and the occupation of tne sur-
rounding territory by Japanese military authorities 11 can 
not be regarded as measures of legitimate, self-defensen.(53) 
Concerning the·man:ner in which the "independent" 
a tate· was fo.rmed.,. the Japanese reply says, 1'Coming to the 
actual establishment of the new state of Ulanchukuo, neither 
the Japanese government nor the ·Japanese H~adquarters St&ff 
gave these wider id~as any encouragement. Baron Shidehara, 
Minister of I<'oreign Affairs, and General Minami, Minister of 
War, both issued instructions on September 26~strictly 
forbidding participation by the Japanese in the various 
attempts to establish a new political authority in Ivianchur:l8, 
and in conformity with these instructions, the Japanese 
authorities, civil as well as military, uniformly abstained 
from interference''.(54) On the other hand, the League Com-
mission points out that the Japanese should be given full 
credit for establishing the puppet state of i1Ianchukuo, a 
proceedure which "is opposed to the interests of China. It 
(53) Lytton Report, p.77. 
(54) League of Nations Official Journal, October 1932. 
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disregards the wishes o~ the people of Manchuria., and it 
is at least questionable whether it will ultimately be to 
the best interests of J-apan" .(55) 
The Heport strongly recommends the calling of an 
advisory conference, to be composed of representatives 
from China and Japan, and of two groups of delegates from 
Manchuria selected respectively by China and Japan with 
neutral observers. Points upon which the conference is 
unable to reach an agreement should be referred to the 
Council of the Leag~e for further consideration. The sugges-
tion is made that the results of the conference should be 
emoodied in three separate instruments: 
1. (a) A declaration should be made by the Nanking Govern-
ment which would distinguish between the power of the 
central government and that of the local government in 
Manchuria. (b) A considerable measure of local autonomy 
should be granted, but the central government should 
reserve complete sovereignty over the region; the net 
income oi' the region should be equitably divided between 
the two administrations. (~) The chief executive of Wan-
churia and his foreign adviser should be appointed by 
the Chinese governm~nt from a panel of names submitted 
by the Council of the L6ague. (d) The Chinese police 
system should be well organized and the Japanese troops 
should be withdrawn. 
{55) Lytton Report, p. 97 
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In accordance with these suggestions, the important 
point·s with ·which the Chinese government disagrees are the 
sedond and the third points • .:>ince China is a sovereign 
state, she has full legal right to do as sho chooses about 
her government and her territory. Thus, the League ought 
not to ask for the local autonomy of Manchuria, or for the 
power to submit a panel of names for Governor of foreign 
advisors. If this were done, Manchuria would not be a 
Chinese territory, but a semi-mandate of the League. 
2. (a) The issue of the ecomomic aspect of the Sino-Japanese 
treaty and the extent of the right of Japan to settla 
and lease land to the whole of Manchuria should be set-
tled. (b) Two foreigners, one of which is Japanese, 
should be attached as advisers to the Supreme Court. 
(c) China shoutd recognize all the definite grants made 
to mapan by the Treaty of 1915. 
Concerning these suggestions, it would seem that 
while Mam~huria may need some advisers in the Supreme Court, 
it is not necessary for her to employ them from Jupan or 
from any other nations. Again, without the ~wenty-One De-
mands, Japan may have her special interests in Manchuria 
according to the treaties and agreements between the two 
nations, but the rights of Japan ought not to be extended 
without further agreement. 
3. (a) A oino-Japanese Treaty of Conciliation, arbitration, 
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non-aggression, and mutual assistance, and a commercial 
treaty ought ~o be drawn up. (b) Economic Boycott is an 
international matter and not a subject of our inquiry. 
These suggestions are wise and ju.st. Chino. will 
accept them unconditionally. Since for the purpose of bett~ 
understanding, mutual respect, and friendly cooperation, 
China always seeks for peace, sincerity, and humanity. 
In conclusion, I would say ~hat the Report in its 
entirety constitutes a vigorous condemnation of the Japanese 
policy in seiz~ng Manchuria by armed force and establishing 
a smoke-screen government. lul the Commissioners are agreed 
that pacific means are available through which Japan may 
safeguard her legitimate r~ght and interest in hlanchuria. 
If the League of Nations, supported by the united States 
will continue to use moral and diplomatic ac~ions in settling 
this case, there will still be a good chance ~f securing 
peace in the Far East and the peace of ~he world. 
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SUMMfiliY 
The complicated nature of the conflicting Sino-
Japanese rights and interests inl'.1anchuria is sufficiently 
indicated in the discussion of the foregoing pages. Iih the 
final analysis, however, the conflict narrows down to a 
single paramount issue. Over a period of ~hirty years, on 
a basis of special political privileges, Japanese enterprise 
has built up an economic structure in lllanchuria of vital 
importance to Japan. In view of tho weakness of Chinese 
governmental administration, it is claimed th~t a contina-
ance of Japan's political rights is essential to guarantee 
the unhampered pursuit of its economic activi~ies. China, 
on the other hand, claims that she is willing and able to 
JUarantee legitimate Japanese business enterprise in Man-
chur~a. But, if Japan blindly pursue~ her own interests in 
utter disregard of China's vital interests, and if Japan is 
bent on imperialistic conquest v1chthout B.Fl.Y consideration for 
China's needs and aspirations, China must resist for the 
sake o~ her self-respect and self-preservation. 
The forceful occupation of 1.Ianchuria by the Japanese 
militarists on the night of September 18, 1931, was an un-
precedented outbreak of international lawlessness. China, 
always abiding by the general principles of international 
law,and conscious of her obligations und~r international 
agreements to which she is a party, has earnestly and 
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continuously demonstrated to the world her unshaking faith ~ 
in the League of Nations as an agency to uphold the cause 
of peace. Bhe believes, also, that the international con-
flict wil~ be readjusted through the democratic principles 
of the Nine Power Treaty and the Briand-Kellogg Pact. Dn-
fortunately both the League of Nations and the Briand-Kel-
logg Pact Association suffer from certain didadvantages. 
One of these is that the guarantee of peace under the Cov-
enant of the League is incomplete, and the security which 
it offers is correspondingly imperfect. Another disadvan-
tage, which is more serious from the standpoint of the 
Chinese, is the non-participation of the United States • 
'l'he Kellogg-Briand Pact Association does not suffer from 
these disadvantages, but it is gravely embarrassed by the 
\~d\ leczgue of organized institutions through which its author-
ity may be exerted, and by the lack of a settled rule of 
action by which it may be known in advance what may be ex-
pected of its members in case of need. Consequently, when 
China presented the case before the League, all the powers 
did not take any active step, but employed the politival 
machinery of the League in a half-hearted and futile manner 
in the present crisis. 
A solution to the problem, if it is to be at all 
permenant, must include three fundamental principles: 
1. Japan must recognize that Manchuria is an integral part 
I' 
I 
I 
of China. 
2. Japan must respect China's sovereignty. 
3. All the powers must no-c only refuse to recognize the 
Manchukuo administration as the 11 de j'l,lre'', but, also as the .. 
11 de facto" gdlvel~nment of Manchuria. 
Hence besides the immediate withdvawal of Japanese 
forves, the Japanese government must indemnify the losses 
on the part of China, arising from the Japanese occupation 
of Manchuria. If Japan is willing to do that, China will 
guarantee ligitimate bus~iness enterprise in hlanchuria, 
(but not admit the necessity of such enterprise continuing 
on the basis of special political privileges wrung from 
-1-i~M€. 
Cgina by force). At the same"one of the leading nations may 
assume the responsibility of leadership in the League or 
the Briand-Kellogg Pact Assocaition, with an appropriate 
understanding wmth the other nations which are specially 
interested in Far Eastern affairs. 1'hen they may deal dir-
ectly wich the Chinese government in Nanking in all matters 
relating to Manchuria, no matter what kind of authority the 
Japanese may try to assume O? the spot. If they are willing 
to do so, it would not amount to a severance of diplomatic 
relations vii th Japan on their part • .Bu-c it would be to their 
own intoPe§ts and for the cause of justice and worlp peace, 
for Manchuria to remain a part of Chinese territory. Whether 
they are willing to take such a step, will show whether, nfte~ 
all, there is justice and righteousness in this world • 
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